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Abstract 
In this work we analyze the effects of credit contagion on the credit quality of a portfolio of 
bank loans issued to SMEs. To this aim we start from the discrete time model proposed in 
Barro and Basso (2005), that considers the counterparty risk generated by the business 
relations in a network of firms, and we modify it by introducing different rating classes in 
order to manage the case of firms with different credit qualities. The transitions from a 
rating class to another  occurs when a proxy for the asset value of the firm crosses some 
rating specific thresholds. We assume that the initial rating transition matrix of the system 
is known, and compute the thresholds using the probability distribution of the steady state 
of the model. A wide Monte Carlo simulation analysis is carried out in order to study the 
dynamic behaviour of the model, and in particular to analyze how the default contagion 
present in the model affects the output rating transition matrix of the portfolio.  
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In this paper we study the effects of credit contagion on the credit quality of 
a portfolio of bank loans; in particular we investigate  how credit contagion 
can affect the credit quality downgrade/upgrade of the firms in the portfolio. 
As it is done in practice, we identify the credit quality of a firm with a 
“rating” associated to it, as the ones assigned by rating agencies such as 
Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s or obtained by internal bank rating systems, 
and we investigate the downgrades and upgrades of the ratings of the firms 
in the portfolio in an dynamic discrete-time setting by means of the dynamic 
rating transition matrix. 
A  number  of  different  approaches  have  been  recently  proposed  in  the 
literature for modelling the credit risk of a portfolio of bank loans; see for 
example Giesecke and Weber (2004): Frey and Backhaus (2004): Egloff, 
Leippold and Vanini, (2007): Neu and Kühn (2004). Among these different 
approaches,  the  counterparty  risk  model  proposed  in  Barro  and  Basso 
(2005) models the asset value of a firm following a structural approach, and 
can be generalized in such a way as to take into account the presence of 
different rating classes.  
In such a model, a proxy  i V   for the asset value of firm i is described as the 
sum  of  three  terms:  a  macroeconomic  component  which  considers  the 
influence of the business cycle through a factor model, a microeconomic 
component which models the business connections with other firms, and a 
residual idiosyncratic random term. The microeconomic component takes 
into consideration the direct business connections between the firms in the 
bank portfolio and their clients, and explains how the default of a client may 
cause financial distress to its suppliers and a possible downgrade of their 
credit  quality.  In  this  way  a  contagion  mechanism  is  introduced  in  the 
model.  
We consider a portfolio of bank loans issued to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), and assume that they have been assigned a rating class 
that reflects their credit quality. We estimate from historical data, using a 
maximum  likelihood  method  under  a  time  homogeneity  assumption,  an initial  rating  transition  matrix  for  the  system,  whose  elements  are  the 
probabilities of the transition from a rating class to another. The transition of 
a firm from a rating class to another occurs when  the value  i V  crosses some 
rating  specific  thresholds  which  are  computed  using  the  probability 
distribution  of  the  steady  state  of  the  model.  In  such  a  way  the  model 
enables to describe the evolution in time of the ratings of all the firms in the 
portfolio. 
In  order  to  analyze  how  the  default  contagion  affects  the  system  and 
influences the credit quality of the firms in the portfolio, we apply a Monte 
Carlo  simulation  technique  and  carry  out  a  wide  simulation  analysis.  In 
particular we simulate the behaviour of the model for different values of the 
parameters on a 10-year time horizon, and we analyze the results obtained 
for the defaults and the rating transitions of the firms in the portfolio.  
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we present a brief review of 
the literature on counterparty risk and contagion models; in Section 3 we 
present the model proposed, which generalizes that presented in Basso and 
Barro  (2005)  and  allows  to  model  the  rating  transitions  of  the  portfolio 
positions year after year. In section 4 we describe the simulation procedure 
applied in the empirical analysis and discuss the results obtained. Finally, 
Section 5 presents some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Counterparty risk and credit contagion models 
In  the  most  popular  models  for  credit  risks,  both  in  reduced  form  and 
structural models, the dependence among the defaults and the credit quality 
downgrades of different firms is modelled using some state variables which 
represent the major macroeconomic factors. In the reduced form models the 
default intensities depend on these factors, while in the structural models it 
is the asset value of firms in the portfolio that depends on them. In both 
approaches,  the  common  dependence  on  these  macroeconomic  variables, 
which reflect the state of the economy and the business cycle, introduces 
some dependence in the rating transitions and in the default probabilities.  Nevertheless,  some  recent  empirical  results  have  pointed  out  that  the 
dependence on common macroeconomic factors fails to explain properly the 
clustering of defaults observed when the economy is in a recession period; 
see for example Jarrow and Yu (2001) and Das, Duffie and Kapadia (2005). 
This  suggests  that  a  firm-specific  risk  term  could  be  introduced,  which 
accounts for the changes in the firms’ health due to some microeconomic 
effect, as for example that generated by the business relations with firms’ 
counterparties.  
To  this  purpose,  Jarrow  and  Yu  (2001)  introduced  the  notion  of 
counterparty  risk,  defined  as  the  risk  that  the  default  of  a  firm’s 
counterparty affects its default probability. In a wider sense the counterparty 
risk can be defined as the risk that the default of a client causes a change in 
the  credit  quality  of  a  firm.  If  the  firms  in  a  portfolio  are  strongly 
interdependent in terms of their business relations, as it is often the case in 
portfolios of bank loans issued to SMEs operating in the same geographical 
area, then the counterparty risk may play an important role; in this case the 
default of one firm induces a contagion effect on other firms through the 
network of the business relations, which can lead to the deterioration of their 
credit quality and even to their default.  
Afterwards, several recent papers have introduced a counterparty risk term 
to  model  a  microeconomic  dependence  in  terms  of  direct  inter-firm 
relationships, often jointly with the dependence on the business cycle.  
Along this line, Giesecke and Weber (2004) presents a model in which firms 
interact  with  their  business  partners  in  a  lattice-type  economy.  Here  the 
contagion  effect  is  modelled  as  liquidity  shocks  generated  when  some 
counterparties fail to honour their obligations; firms in the economy jump 
from a “good” state to a “bad” one, and vice versa, with an intensity that is 
proportional to the number of their counterparties in the opposite state. The 
empirical investigation of this model shows that the contagion process leads 
to additional fluctuations of the portfolio losses around their averages. 
In Egloff, Leippold and Vanini (2007), microstructural data obtained from a 
bank’s credit risk department are used to build a topological risk map of the bank’s credit portfolio, which is represented by a weighted graph connecting 
firms in the portfolio, where the weights are related to the business relations 
between  the  firms.  Then  Monte  Carlo  simulation  is  used  to  analyze  the 
effects  of  different  interdependence  microstructures  on  the  correlation 
structure and on the risk figures of the credit portfolio; their findings show 
that the tail behaviour of the portfolio credit losses is significantly modified 
by the presence of the contagion effect. 
Neu and Kühn (2004), in analogy with a lattice gas model borrowed from 
physics, models the correlations between sequential defaults by introducing 
functionally defined couplings between mutually dependent counterparties. 
The paper focuses on the estimation of the impact of the counterparty risk 
on the capital allocations in loan portfolios; the outcomes obtained by  a 
simulation analysis of the model again suggest that corporate dependency 
introduces  an  additional  source  of  risk  and  can  significantly  amplify  the 
portfolio losses. 
 
3. Modelling credit contagion and rating transitions in a portfolio of 
bank loans 
The main goal of this contribution is to propose a model that allows to study 
the effects of the counterparty risk not only on the clustering of defaults in a 
SME  bank  loan  portfolio,  but  also  on  the    co-movements  of  the  credit 
quality of firms. To this aim, let us relate the credit quality of a firm i (for 
i=1,…,N), to the value of a proxy for the firm’s asset value at time t,  ( ) i V t , 
and let us model  ( ) i V t  as the sum of three components: a macroeconomic 
one  i F , influenced by the business cycle; a microeconomic component  i M  
which accounts for the contagion effects produced by the defaults of the 
major clients of a firm; and an idiosyncratic random term  i ε .  
As  in  Barro  and  Basso  (2005),  the  macroeconomic  component  ( ) i F t   is 
described by a factor model                                      
( )
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where  1 2 ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( )) J Y t Y t Y t … Y t = , , ,  is the vector of the values at time t of the 
driving factors,  ( ) {1 } s i … S ∈ , ,  is the economic sector of firm  i, and 
s
j β  is 
the weight of factor  j  for the firms of sector  s. The driving factors  ( ) j Y t  
are  assumed  to  follow  some  stochastic  process,  with  covariance  matrix 
( ) Y t ∑ .  
In order to model the microeconomic component  ( ) i M t , let us define the 
following  measure  ( ) i D t  of the distress suffered by firm i at time t, as the 
difference between the average default rate of the economy  ( ) p t  and the 
percentage of the turnover of firm i sold to clients which defaulted at time t  
                             
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i
i k ik i
k C t
D t p t t w t p t r t δ
∈
 
= − + ,  
  ∑                       (2) 
where  ( ) i C t  denotes the set of the major clients of firm i at time t,  ik w  is 
the percentage of the sales to major client  k  on the turnover of firm  i, 
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= − ∑  is the per cent value of the turnover of firm  i sold to 
all the minor clients and  ( ) k t δ  is  a binary value which takes value 1 if 
client  k  defaults  at  time  t,  0  otherwise.  Notice  that  the  distress  measure 
( ) i D t  has a positive value if the percentage of the turnover of the firm sold 
to clients which defaulted at time t is lower than the average default rate in 
the economy and a negative value if it is higher. The basic idea is that the 
distress component affects the health of a firm with a one period delay, and 
its effects decay exponentially in time.  
The microeconomic component  ( ) i M t can be modelled in the following way 
( ) ( )
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where s R µ + ∈  is a real parameter dependent on the economic sector of the 
firm and  0 1 s λ ≤ <  is the dampening factor which determines the distress 
memory of the firms in sector s.  The  residual  idiosyncratic  terms  ( ) i t ε   are  assumed  to  be  normally 
distributed  with  zero  mean  and  standard  deviation  ( ) s i σ ,  mutually 
independent and independent of the driving factors  ( ) j Y t .  
Therefore,  ( ) i V t  is given by  
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To  analyze  the  credit  quality  upgrades/downgrades  of  the  firms  in  the 
portfolio we adopt the commonly used rating approach. Let us consider an 
ordered set of rating classes  {1 } … K , ,  that reflect the credit quality of the 
firms  in  the  portfolio  through  a  mapping  {1 } i i r … K ∈ , , ֏ ,  where  1 
represents the best rating class and  K  the worst one,  1 K +  representing 
then the absorbing default state. We assume that the initial classification is 
determined a priori by some rating system, either external (e.g. provided by 
an  external  rating  agency  as  Moody’s  or  Standard  &  Poor’s)  or  internal 
(when a bank internal rating systems is used). 
As it is generally done in the framework of structural models, let us assume 
that there exists a set of sector-specific thresholds 
                    1 1 0
s s s s
j K j K j j d d … d d , + , , , −∞ = ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ = +∞                             (5) 
for the proxy  ( ) i V t  of the value of firms in the k-th rating class, such that, if 
( ) i r t k = , then  ( ) 1 ' i r t k + =  if and only if 
( ) ( )
1 ( 1) [ [
s i s i
i k k k k V t d d ′ ′ , , − + ∈ , .                                                                                                                          
Of course the determination of these thresholds becomes a crucial point in 
our model. To this aim, let us observe that we may estimate the probability 
s
k k p ′ ,  of transition in one year from rating k to rating  ' k  from historical data 
referring  to  large  populations  of  firms;  such  estimates,  if  taken  over  a 
sufficiently long period of time, give an estimate of the unconditional rating 
transition probabilities, since they may be approximately considered as free 
of cyclical effects connected to the current state of the economy.  
For example, let us assume to use the time series of the one-year credit 
transition matrices for years  1, … , T. It is known that the arithmetic mean of  the  one-year  rating  transition  frequencies  gives  an  estimate  of  the 
unconditional rating transition probabilities that underestimates the default 
probabilities in the best rating classes. In order to avoid such a drawback, 
following an idea similar to that discussed in Lando and Skødeberg (2002), 
we  could  use  the  following  maximum  likelihood  estimator  for  Markov 
chains under a time homogeneity assumption: 
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where  ( ) i N t  is the number of firms in rating class i at time t and ( ) , i j N T  is 
the total number of transitions from rating i to rating  j over the time horizon 
of interest. 
Moreover let us observe that by construction  ( ) 0 i E M t   =    for all t, so that 
the estimate of the unconditional rating transition probabilities, if based on a 
sufficiently  large  sample  of  firms,  may  also  be  considered  as  free  of 
contagion  effects.  Hence,  if    eq.  (4)  has  a  stationary  state,  the  rating 
transition matrix (6) gives an estimate of the unconditional transition matrix 
of the model in this stationary state.  
For example, let us assume that the macroeconomic part is described by a 
single factor model which follows this mean reverting  (1) AR  process  
                       ( 1) ( ) ( ( )) ( 1) Y Y t Y t a b Y t u t σ + = + − + +  ,                          (7) 
 where  ( ) (0 1) u t N , ∼  ,  , a b R ∈ ,  0 Y σ >  and let  1
s β =  for all sectors. Then 
in  the  stationary  state  the  macroeconomic  component  is    normally 
distributed  with mean equal to the long term mean b of  ( ) Y t  and standard 
deviation  Y σ .  
As for the microeconomic term, we may assume that it is approximately 
normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation  M σ , and that it is 
independent both of the stationary state macroeconomic component, and of 
the idiosyncratic term. 
Under these assumptions, the value of  ( ) i V t  when the macroeconomic term in  stationary  state  is  normally  distributed  with  mean  0  and  standard 
deviation 
2 2 2
Y M s σ σ σ + + . 
In general, let G denote the probability distribution function of  ( ) i V t  when 
the macroeconomic term is in the stationary state; if G is  invertible, then the 
rating transition thresholds  '
s
k k d
, can be computed  as follows  
                         
1
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−
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                                  ' ' ' 1 ( ) ( )
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4. Simulation analysis of rating transitions 
In order to test the model proposed in the previous section and study its 
dynamic  behaviour  we  have  carried  out  a  wide  simulation  analysis  by 
randomly  generating a  portfolio of bank loans with  10000 N =  positions 
issued to SMEs.  
For  each  firm  in  the  portfolio  the  number  of  clients  has  been  randomly 
generated according to  a normal distribution with mean 50 and standard 
deviation 25, while the volume of sales to each client has been generated 
according to a lognormal distribution with parameters 5 and 2.  
The default or survival status of each client at each time period  has been 
generated according to a Bernoulli random variable with mean equal to the 
average default rate of  the economy  ( ) p t ; moreover, each time a major 
client defaulted, we assumed that in time it is replaced by another client 
with the same business volume. 
The  number  of  rating  classes  considered  is  7 K = ,  corresponding  to  the 
classes  from  AAA  to  C   in  the  S&P  classification,  and  each  firm  was 
assigned an initial rating class randomly generated according to the S&P 














Table 1. Relative distribution of obligors in the rating classes  AAA - C 
(source: S&P technical report, 2003). 
 
Once generated the initial composition of the portfolio, in the simulations 
the defaulted obligors were replaced by new randomly generated obligors, 
so that the number of positions in the portfolio was kept constant in time. 
As in eq. (7), for the macroeconomic term (1) we have considered a single 
factor which follows a mean reverting  (1) AR  process with  0 5 a = . ,  1 b =  
and  0 08 Y σ = . . As regards the parameters  µ  and σ , which represent the 
relative impact of the microeconomic and the idiosyncratic components on 
( ) i V t ,  respectively,  the  simulations  have  been  carried  out  for  a  set  of 
different  values,  namely  0,10,20,30,40,50 µ =   and 
0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7 σ = . 
For  the  determination  of  the  thresholds 
s
k k d ′ ,   in  the  first  place  we  have 
estimated the one-year rating transition matrix from the time series of S&P 
historical  rating  matrices  in  the  period  1988 2002 −   using  the  MLE 




   AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B  C  D 
AAA  0.9243  0.064  0.0091  0.0005  0.002  0.0001  0  0.0001 
AA  0.0061  0.9109  0.0761  0.0057  0.0006  0.0004  0  0.0001 
A  0.0004  0.0129  0.9368  0.0436  0.0047  0.0011  0.0002  0.0002 
BBB  0.0003  0.0023  0.0479  0.9024  0.0393  0.0063  0.0008  0.0008 
BB  0  0.0012  0.009  0.0869  0.8268  0.0612  0.0084  0.0065 
B  0.0001  0.0022  0.0024  0.0084  0.0643  0.8252  0.0534  0.0440 
C  0.0025  0.0003  0.0053  0.0017  0.0215  0.0674  0.4539  0.4474 
 
Table 2. One-year rating transition matrix estimated using the MLE (6). 
 
In  the  second  place  we  have  carried  out  a  first  set  of  Monte  Carlo 
simulations in order to analyze the distribution of the microeconomic part 
( ) i M t  for different values of  µ  and σ  and compute the rating thresholds 
for the different rating classes. The firm specific information about the past 
(for t < 0) were assumed to be not available and accordingly in eq. (3) we 
set  ( ) 0 i D t =  for  1, 2,... t = − − . 
For each couple (µ ,σ ) we generated 10000 paths for  ( ) Y t  and  ( ) i t ε  on a 
time horizon of 10 years, with a one-year time step. The empirical results 
obtained  confirms  that  in  each  period  ( ) i M t can  be  considered  as 
approximately normally distributed with mean 0. As for as the value of the 
standard  deviation  M σ is  concerned,  it  turns  out  to  be  not  only  linearly 
dependent on   µ  (which can be immediately seen from eq. (3)), but also 
approximately linearly dependent on  σ (see table 3). 
Using the values obtained for  M σ  in this first set of simulations, we have 
computed  the  rating  transition  thresholds  '
s
k k d
,   for  each  rating  class 
according to eqs. (8)-(9). An  example of the thresholds obtained for the 
different rating classes is presented in table 4. These rating thresholds were 
held constant over time in the simulations carried out in the second step. 
 σ/µ 
                   
10  20        30  40  50 
0.3  0.000137  0.000256  0.000386  0.000513  0.000647 
0.4  0.000414  0.000824  0.001238  0.001631  0.002057 
0.5  0.000743  0.001489  0.002239  0.002971  0.003725 
0.6  0.001041  0.002084  0.003143  0.004173  0.005211 
0.7  0.001298  0.002595  0.003865  0.005164  0.006459 
 
Table 3. Values of  M σ for different values of µ and σ . 
 
AAA  0.5548 0.2972 0.13619 0.11575 -0.09914 -0.15469 -0.15469
AA  1.77638 0.56972 0.23383 0.04936 -0.02166 -0.15469 -0.15469
A  2.02165 1.68754 0.4887 0.22362 0.07857 -0.04099 -0.09914
BBB  2.09915 1.87154 1.5095 0.48068 0.25065 0.08474 0.02014
BB  +∞ 1.94253 1.71998 1.40309 0.55545 0.3254 0.22883
B  2.15473 1.87985 1.80637 1.69028 1.44175 0.59745 0.4703
C  1.87154 1.86014 1.74652 1.72464 1.57813 1.40021 0.95894
 
Table 4. Rating thresholds  of the different rating classes for  30 µ =  and 
0.3 σ = . 
 
In the third place, we have carried a second set of simulations in order to 
study the dynamic behaviour of the model, and to analyze the values of the 
main quantities of interest as time varies. Again, we generated 10000 paths 
of the macroeconomic and of the idiosyncratic component for each couple 
(µ ,σ )  ,  as  in  the  first  step  simulations.  In  this  set  of  simulations  we 
focused  our  attention  on  the  analysis  of  the  one-year  rating  transition 
matrices,  the  default  rate  for  each  rating  class  and  the  resulting  average 
default rate of the portfolio, and the distribution of the firms in the portfolio 
in the different rating classes. 
As  regards  the  one-year  rating  transition  matrices,  the  simulation  results 
indicate that on average it takes three years for the system to get rid of the initial  conditions,  while  after  this  initial  period  the  behaviour  of  these 
matrices  is  quite  stable  in  time,  in  the  sense  that  the  average  transition 
matrices, computed by averaging the transition matrices obtained over all 
the  10000  paths  simulated  for  the  macroeconomic  factor,  do  not  change 
significantly  as  time  varies.  Two  examples  of  the  matrices  observed  at 
different times are shown in tables 4 and 5. 
 
  AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B  C  D 
AAA  0,92575  0,06182  0,00914  0,00054  0,00223  0,00013  0  0,00039 
AA  0,00671  0,90788  0,07751  0,00621  0,00072  0,00056  0  0,00042 
A  0,00056  0,01366  0,93356  0,04486  0,00518  0,00131  0,00028  0,00059 
BBB  0,00023  0,0025  0,04946  0,89804  0,04058  0,00688  0,00095  0,00136 
BB  0  0,0013  0,00951  0,08879  0,82138  0,06241  0,00890  0,00770 
B  0,00011  0,00241  0,00256  0,00884  0,06576  0,81990  0,05394  0,04649 
C  0,00275  0,00033  0,00566  0,00178  0,02212  0,06830  0,45034  0,44873 
 




  AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B  C  D 
AAA  0,92753  0,06038  0,00883  0,00051  0,00221  0,00015  0  0,00039 
AA  0,00682  0,90852  0,07685  0,00613  0,00071  0,00056  0  0,00041 
A  0,00058  0,01391  0,93377  0,04449  0,0051  0,00131  0,00027  0,00058 
BBB  0,00024  0,00257  0,05011  0,89788  0,04013  0,0068  0,00093  0,00134 
BB  0  0,00136  0,00971  0,08958  0,82094  0,06198  0,00882  0,00761 
B  0,00012  0,00245  0,00261  0,00894  0,06645  0,81976  0,05358  0,04607 
C  0,00279  0,00034  0,00569  0,00187  0,02248  0,069  0,45224  0,44557 
 
Table 6. Rating transition matrix obtained with  30 µ =  and  0.3 σ =  at time 
t= 10. 
 
We  have  also  measured  the  distance  between  the  average  of  the  rating 
transition matrices obtained with the simulation at times t=3,4,...,10 and the 
initial rating transition matrix estimated using the MLE (6) and presented in table 2; as a measure of the distance between two matrices P and Q we used 
, ,
,
( , ) i j i j
i j
d P Q p q = − ∑   .  
As can be seen in figures 1 and 2, it turns out that the distance is quite small 
for the smaller values of  µ while it increases as  µ increases and it is also 
very sensitive to the increments of  σ . Moreover, it can be observed that 
when  µ has a strictly positive value the distance increases with σ , while 
the  converse  holds  when  µ is  equal  to  0,  i.e.  if  the  microeconomic 
component is not present in the model. In addition, the simulation results 
tend to give rating transition matrices with smaller diagonal elements and 
higher  off-diagonal  elements  than  the  initial  transition  matrix,  with  the 
effect to increase the probability of changing class (including the default 
probability for the different rating classes) and to reduce that of staying in 
the same class. 
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     Figure  1:  Distance  between  the  average  rating  transition  matrices 
obtained  with  the  simulation  and  the  initial  matrix  as  µ varies  for  
different values of σ .  
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Figure 2: Distance between the average rating transition matrices 
obtained with the simulation and the initial matrix as σ varies for 
different values of µ . 
 
As for as the dynamic behaviour of the average default rate of the portfolio 
is concerned, the simulation outcomes indicate that it tends to converge to a 
limit value as time increases. For small values of both µ and σ, this limit 
value  is  very  close  to  the  initial  average  default  rate  obtained  using  the 
estimated initial transition matrix, while it is significantly higher for higher 
values of µ and especially  of σ. An example of the dynamic behaviour of 
the portfolio average default rate is shown in figure 3. 
Furthermore, we have analyzed the dynamics of the distribution of the firms 
in the different rating classes as time varies. The results suggest that the 
model shows the tendency to increase in time the population of the “central” 
rating classes A and BBB, and to slightly decrease the others, except for the 
extreme classes AAA and C, whose relative weight keeps nearly constant. 
This  behaviour  can  be  observed  for  all  pairs  of  values  for     and  σ;  an 
example of this tendency is shown in figure 4. 
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Figure 3: Average default rate of the system as t varies for µ=30, 
σ=0.3. 
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Figure 4: Dynamics of the relative distribution of the firms in the 
rating classes for   = 30 and σ = 0.3. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In  this  contribution  we  have  proposed  a  credit  contagion  model  which 
explicitly  takes  into  account  both  a  macroeconomic  effect  and  a microeconomic term which describes the counterparty risk. In a structural 
approach, we have introduced a set of thresholds for the value of a firm 
whose  passage  induces  either  a  downgrade  or  an  upgrade  of  the  credit 
quality  of  the  firm  considered  and  leads  to  a  change  in  the  rating  class 
assigned to it. 
The dynamic properties of the model and the effects of the counterparty risk 
on a portfolio of bank loans have been studied by means of a of a wide 
Monte Carlo simulation analysis. 
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